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Afghanistan, Central Asia Pakistan and the United States Musa Khan Jalalzai Bookbiz Jalal Center, 59-A, Mozang Road, Lahore. Ph: 042-637401 2 Fax:042-6308920 O Book Biz 2003 First Publishing 2003 ISBN 969-876 1-0 1-2 Composed by: Gul Graphics Ph: 72 10404. Printed in Pakistan by: Shirkat Printing Press, Lahore. Published by: Muhammad Nasir Raza, Bookbiz Jalal Center, 59-a, Mozang Road, Lahore. Ph:042-63 740 12 Fax: 042-6308920. E- m ail: bookbiz -a [email protected] CONTENTS Preface Chapter-1 PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN Chapter-? 15 BRITISH -AFGHAN AGREEMENTS Chapter-3 22 PAK- AFGHAN RELATIONS AFTER PARTITION. Chapter-4 26 THE PAKHTOONISTAN ISSUE. (Louis Dupree) Chapter-5 PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS DUFUNG THE DAUD REGIME Chapter-6 THE SOVIET lNVASION ON AFGHANISTAN Chapter-7 THEGENEVAACCORD 60 Chapter-8 AFGHANISTAN : JIHAD TO CIVIL WAR (Abdul Sattar) Chapter-9 AFGHANISTAN: PESHAWAR ACCORDAND AFTER (Amera Saeed) Chapter-10 162 NEW WORLD ORDER OR DISORDER: ARMED STRUGGLE IN AFGHANISTAN AND UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY OBECTIVES. (Hafizullah Emadi) Chapter-1 1 187 TALIBAN AND THE POST TALIBAN SCENARIO 5 Chapter-12 192 A ROAD TO NOWHERE AFGHANISTAN CENTRAL ASlA AND THE TALIBAN. (Riccardo Redaelli) Chapter-13 PERSPECTIVE ON THE 199 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND CENTRAL AISA AFTER THE BREAK UP OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION (Dr. Muhammad Anwar Khan) Chapter44 212 POWER GAME PJ CENTRAL ASIA (Lietennnt Colonel Asim Saleem Bajwa) 245 Chapter-15 SOUTH-WEST ASlA AFTER THE TALIBAN. (Muhammad Ayoob) 276 Chapter46 WALKING SOFTLY PJ AFGHANISTAN: THE FUTURE OF UN STATE-BUILDING (Simon Chesterman) 291 Chapter-1 7 THE AFGHAN SPILLOVERS 297 Chapter-18 AMERICA'S NEW WORLD ORDER (Najmudin A Sheikh) Preface The U.S War on terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan has created many problems for the investment community in the region, but the U.S could nothing gain. The People of Afghanistan and Pakistan have now fill much difficulties in the American forces and their so called operation against terrorism. On December 1979, after the Soviet invasion on Afghanistan Pakistan realized a constant threat from Afghanistan. Pakistan, however, from 1980-1 9889, supported the struggle in Afghanistan and played a good diplomatic role in mobilizing world community. According to Babar shah: At the same time Pakistan continued its diplomatic efforts to get the conflict resolved. It called upon the UNSC to condemn the soviet invasion but the resolution was vetoed by the USSR. This resolution was adopted by the UN general Assembly in January 1980, by 104 votes. Pakistan realised that the world community was overwhelmingly against the soviet invasion. From then on it became a test of Pakistan's international credibility to keep the number of votes increasing at each section. The number of votes rose to 123 in 1987. In the none aligned movement's meeting in new Delhi in November 198 1, though India and some pro-soviet countries try to play down the afshan crisis, Pakistan and its friends succeeded in making the NAM express grave concern over the continuing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan. Agho shnhi insisted on the insertion of a call for the withdrawal of soviet forces in the text of the final declaration of the conference. 55 coufitries out of the 96 presented supported Pakistan 8 After the Soviet troops withdrawal the Kabul regime continued to maintain its rule, but, its authority and influence were gradually eroding g. The demise of the Soviet Union in 1990 not only led to the independence of several Central Asian .states but also paved the road for substantial political transformation in Mghanistan. The Kabul regime conceded to the United Nations peace formula detailing the transfer of power to a transitional Islamic government headed by Sebyhatullah Moj haddadi in April 1992 who was succeeded by Burhanuddin Rabbani, head of the Jamit-e-lslamic party on 30 August 1992. Najibullah resigned and tried to leave the country for India. On his way to the airport opposition forces prevented his departure, and he was forced to seek rehge at the United Nations ofice in Kabul where he remained until he was dragged out and hang ed by the Taliban militias who seized power in Kabul on 26 September 1996. Although the United States did not open its embassy in Kabul, on 7 October 1992 President George Bush .declared that the United States will provide financial assistance and resume normal diplomatic ties with Afghanistan . When .the struggle for power escalated among various Islamists and gradually assumed ethnic character with each ethnic group being forced to rally behind its leader, Pakistan's policy hrther ethnicized post- Soviet politics in Afghanistan by its support of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar against Rabbani-a Tajik from Badakhshan province. The seizure of Kabul by the Taliban, student militia trained in religious schools in Pakistan, could not be accomplished without the support of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United States. The main objective of US policy in Afghanistan has been to establish a secure pipeline to export fossil fbels from Central Asia to Western markets via Mghanistan. US allies, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia's strategic interest in Central Asia include the former's desire 9 to have access to the natural resources and the latter to prevent Iran's influence and religious authority in the newly independent republics. US ambassador John C. Monjo and his Pakistani counterpart visited Taliban's headquarters, Qandahar, in October 1994 without permission of the Rabbani regime. The horrific nature of the attacks of 1 I September enabled the United States to mobilize widespread international support. On 12 September, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1 3 68, effectively authorizing the use of force in response to the events of 1 I September. All major powers, including china, denounced the attacks. NATO invoked articles 5 provisions, defining the attacks on United States as an attack on all numbers of the alliance. However, US policymakers were intent on building a US- directed coalitions of the willing not one involving collective decision-making. The United States would request specific support consult with coalition numbers, but reserve decision-making for itself. While NATO acceded to US requests for deployment of AWACS aircraft and other support only Britain became an immediate close collaborator in Afghanistan. Japan agreed to provide intelligence and logistical support within its constitutional constraints. Singapore became of key importance in facilitating air-to-air reheling and providing port facilities to US carries. Russia provided a significant and unusual quantity of military information. Coalition-building in the region was operationally more essential than elsewhere, but proved more difficult. Mghanistan, a landlocked, remote and mountainous country is situated far from US bases and facilities. Even the impressive power-projection capabilities of the US armed forces would be severely tested in this conflict. At the outside of the conflict, the United States had no access to bases or facilities in any of Mghanistan's neighbors. Basing operation in the Persian Gulf was problematic