Harald Wiese Advanced Microeconomics Advanced Microeconomics Harald Wiese Advanced Microeconomics Harald Wiese Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften Universität Leipzig Leipzig, Germany ISBN 978-3-658-34958-5 ISBN 978-3-658-34959-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34959-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. 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The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany Für Corinna, Ben, Jasper und Samuel Preface What is this book about? This is a course on advanced microeconomics. It covers a lot of ground, from decision theory to game theory, from bargaining to auction theory, from household theory to oligopoly theory, and from the theory of general equilibrium to regulation theory. It has been used for several years at the university of Leipzig in the Master program “Economics”. A lecturer may find advisable to make some more difficult material non-obligatory, as I do in Leipzig. What about mathematics ... ? A course in advanced microeconomics can use more advanced mathematics, such as open sets or Brouwer’s fix-point theorem. I decided not to relegate theseconceptstoanappendixbuttodealwiththemwheretheyareneeded. Exercises and solutions The main text is interspersed with questions and problems. Solutions or hints are given at the end of each chapter. On top, we add a few exercises without solutions. Thank you! Frank Hüttner translated some of the material from German to English. He and Andreas Tutic suggested both interesting and boring exercises. Franziska Beltz improved the quality of the many figures in the textbook. Somegenerationsofstudentsalsoprovidedfeedbackthathelpedtoimprove the manuscript. Michael Diemer, Pavel Brendler, Mathias Klein, Hendrik Kohrs,MaxLillack,KatharinaLotzen,andKatharinaZalewskideservespe- cial mention. Hendrik Kohrs and Katharina Lotzen checked the manuscript and the corresponding slides in detail. The latter also produced the index. Vital last-minute help with technical matters was provided by Alexander Singer. He and Johanna Freistühler checked the manuscript for remaining mistakes. Leipzig, June 2021 Harald Wiese Contents Chapter I. Cooperation as the central focus of microeconomics 1 1. Three modes of cooperation 1 2. This book 3 Part A. Basic decision and preference theory 7 Chapter II. Decisions in strategic form 9 1. Introduction and three examples 9 2. Sets, functions, and real numbers 12 3. Dominance and best responses 15 4. Mixed strategies and beliefs 17 5. Rationalizability 23 6. Topics and literature 25 7. Solutions 25 8. Further exercises without solutions 29 Chapter III. Decisions in extensive form 31 1. Introduction and two examples 31 2. Decision trees and actions 33 3. Strategies and subtrees: perfect information 35 4. Strategies and subtrees: imperfect information 42 5. Moves by nature, imperfect information, and perfect recall 47 6. Topics 51 7. Solutions 51 8. Further exercises without solutions 56 Chapter IV. Ordinal preference theory 59 1. The vector space of goods and its topology 59 2. Preference relations 65 3. Axioms: convexity, monotonicity, and continuity 69 4. Utility functions 74 5. Quasi-concave utility functions and convex preferences 79 6. Marginal rate of substitution 82 IX X CONTENTS 7. Topics 87 8. Solutions 88 9. Further exercises without solutions 92 Chapter V. Decisions under risk 93 1. Simple and compound lotteries 93 2. The St.Petersburg lottery 96 3. Preference axioms for lotteries 100 4. Risk attitudes 103 5. Stochastic dominance 110 6. Topics 118 7. Solutions 119 8. Further exercises without solutions 125 Part B. Household theory and theory of the firm 127 Chapter VI. The household optimum 129 1. Budget 129 2. The household optimum 135 3. Comparative statics and vocabulary 142 4. Solution theory 151 5. Indirect utility function 159 6. Consumer’s rent and Marshallian demand 162 7. Topics 165 8. Solutions 165 9. Further exercises without solutions 171 Chapter VII. Comparative statics and duality theory 173 1. The duality approach 173 2. Envelope theorems and Shephard’s lemma 180 3. Concavity, the Hesse matrix, and the Hicksian law of demand 184 4. Slutsky equations 190 5. Compensating and equivalent variations 196 6. Topics 205 7. Solutions 205 8. Further exercises without solutions 208 Chapter VIII. Production theory 209 1. The production set 209 2. Efficiency 213 3. Convex production sets and convave production functions 219 CONTENTS XI 4. Exploring the production mountain (function) 222 5. Topics 228 6. Solutions 228 7. Further exercises without solutions 230 Chapter IX. Cost minimization and profit maximization 231 1. Revisiting the production set 231 2. Cost minimization 233 3. Long-run and short-run cost minimization 238 4. Profit maximization 240 5. Profit maximization? 244 6. The separation function of markets 253 7. Topics 255 8. Solutions 255 9. Further exercises without solutions 260 Part C. Games and industrial organization 261 Chapter X. Games in strategic form 263 1. Introduction, examples, and definition 263 2. Dominance 269 3. Best responses and Nash equilibria 274 4. ... for mixed strategies, also 276 5. Existence and number of mixed-strategy equilibria 281 6. Critical reflections on game theory 283 7. Topics 285 8. Solutions 285 9. Further exercises without solutions 288 Chapter XI. Price and quantity competition 289 1. Monopoly: Pricing policy 289 2. Price competition 294 3. Monopoly: quantity policy 299 4. Quantity competition 312 5. Topics and literature 322 6. Solutions 323 7. Further exercises without solutions 328 Chapter XII. Games in extensive form 329 1. Examples 329 2. Defining strategies 341 XII CONTENTS 3. Subgame perfection and backward induction 344 4. Multi-stage games 346 5. Product differentiation 349 6. Application: Strategic trade policy 356 7. Topics and literature 361 8. Solutions 361 9. Further exercises without solutions 366 Chapter XIII. Repeated games 367 1. Example: Repeating the pricing game 367 2. Definitions 371 3. Equilibria of stage games and of repeated games 372 4. The infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma 374 5. Topics 378 6. Solutions 378 7. Further exercises without solutions 380 Part D. Bargaining theory and Pareto optimality 381 Chapter XIV. Pareto optimality in microeconomics 383 1. Introduction: Pareto improvements 383 2. Identical marginal rates of substitution 384 3. Identical marginal rates of transformation 390 4. Equality of marginal rates of substitution and transformation 392 5. Topics 398 6. Solutions 398 7. Further exercises without solutions 402 Chapter XV. Cooperative game theory 403 1. Introduction 403 2. The coalition function 403 3. Summing and zeros 405 4. Solution correspondences 406 5. The Shapley value 411 6. Simple games 416 7. Five non-simple games 420 8. Topics and literature 425 9. Solutions 425 Chapter XVI. The Rubinstein bargaining model 433 1. Introduction 433