05 CIWAWO1C algeria - University of Virginia

22 Pages·2006·1.63 MB·English

by  C Kathleen Berry

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Algeria (1992–present)
Introduction Country Background
The Algerian civil war that began in 1992 has Algeria’s war for independence from France,
gained notoriety for several reasons. It origi- fought between 1954 and 1962, brought to a
nated in a democratic process that came to an close more than one hundred years of colonial
abrupt halt and had massacres of civilians that rule.Power struggles within the Front de Libéra-
were shocking in their scale and atrocity. The tion Nationale (FLN), which—along with its
government received significant amounts of ex- military organization the Armeé de Libération
ternal support despite accusations ofwidespread Nationale (ALN)—was the force behind the
abuses relating to its prosecution ofthe conflict, struggle for independence,continued during the
and many recognized the possibility that Algeria conflict.
represented another foothold for "radical Islam." By the time Algeria gained its independence
In part because analysts often choose to in- on July 2, 1962, the confrontation between the
vestigate puzzles pertaining to one or another of general staff of the armed forces and the provi-
these attention-catching aspects,research on the sional government had grown particularly in-
conflict has generated a number of seemingly tense as forces loyal to each group fought for
competing perspectives,each with its own con- control.This period is coded as a civil war (Doyle
clusions about the causes of the war and the and Sambanis 2000;Fearon and Laitin 2003).In
logic ofits conduct.Approaching Algeria from a August, the provisional government offered to
comparative perspective on civil wars allows a surrender,but the military faction continued to
synthesis of the insights of previous research press the fight,successfully taking Algiers by Sep-
and a comprehensive understanding of the war. tember 8.Ahmed Ben Bella was chosen as presi-
Attention to the details of the Algerian civil war dent of the republic and Ferhat Abbas as presi-
also offers a promising opportunity to refine dent of the National Assembly in the elections
theories of civil war. War duration as a conse- that followed on September 20,1962 (Laremont
quence of the interaction between governments 2000).Ben Bella thus took control of what was,
and insurgents rather than of determining through a referendum on proposals for the con-
structural factors,the role of diasporal commu- stitution,a one-party state in which the executive
nities defined on the basis of factors other than and the FLN had exclusive power, the National
national identity,and the nature of opportunity Assembly standing without any functions ofcon-
costs to war emerge as important areas offuture sequence. In the years following independence,
inquiry. Ben Bella worked to consolidate his power,and
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by September 13, 1963, he held the offices of to the early years of Benjedid’s presidency, that
commander-in-chief of the military and prime period saw a general worsening ofthe economic
minister in addition to his original presidential situation. Increasing unemployment, particu-
portfolio. larly problematic for young,well-educated Alge-
Ben Bella was opposed by other personalities rians, encouraged participation in the informal
from the war of decolonization, who founded economy (known as trabendo). As the global
the Front des Forces Socialistes(FFS) later in the prices ofoil and gas fell through the mid-1980s,
month. The FFS carried out attacks in early dramatically reducing the revenue available to it
1964, even attempting to assassinate Ben Bella. from these sectors,the government under Bend-
Although the FFS did not successfully mount its jedid realized the importance of moving away
challenge to Ben Bella’s government,late in 1964 from a centrally planned,socialist economy to-
Houari Boumedienne, formerly head of the ward a market economy. The government was
ALN and the minister of war under Ben Bella, no longer able to sustain its provision of social
carried out a military coup against Ben Bella on welfare to the public—which up to that point
June 19, 1965. Boumedienne’s rule lasted for had been part of an implicit deal between the
thirteen years until his death in 1978. He was government and the public, the public con-
succeeded by Colonel Chadli Bendjedid, who tributing its support or at least lack of demands
was nominated by a FLN party congress and on the government.In the face ofthese changes,
won 94 percent ofvotes in a referendum on Feb- the government drew up plans to encourage pri-
ruary 7, 1979. Bendjedid’s rule was similarly vate sector growth and participation in develop-
long lived,and he remained in office until 1992. ment and foreign investment. Interestingly, the
Although economic and political liberalization gradual opening of Algeria’s economy that
occurred at various points in the period follow- began during this period ended up playing an
ing independence, Algeria remained firmly a important role in generating additional rev-
dictatorship throughout the period. enues for the government and in increasing
Algeria’s economy at independence faced a funds available to the insurgents once conflict
grave problem: The departure of Algerians of broke out (as elaborated later in this article).Di-
French descent left the country without quali- rectly prior to the war, Algeria’s real gross do-
fied administrators or professionals in many mestic product (GDP) per capita was US $4,902.
fields.Unemployment at independence stood at
approximately 45 percent. Ben Bella began a
Conflict Background
process similar to nationalization, under which
workers attained self-management but were for Algeria’s war of independence from France is
all intents and purposes employed by the state often taken as a reference point for those analyz-
because of the institutional arrangements used. ing the conflict that began in the 1990s. The
Ben Bella did not,however,address moderniza- form of the opposition insurgent organizations
tion of the agricultural sector. Industrialization in both wars is seen as similar: the FLN in the
became a key priority during Boumedienne’s war of independence, like the Front Islamique
presidency, along with redistribution of land du Salut (FIS),served to unify the diverse inter-
and continued nationalization. The 1973 oil ests against the incumbent government; the
price increases by OPEC facilitated the plans for Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS), viewed as a
“state-led development”(Entelis 2000). military force serving the goals of the FIS,may
Although progress was made in carrying out thus perform a function akin to that ofthe ALN,
Boumedienne’s economic plans, agriculture the military wing ofthe FLN.The two wars have
continued to get little governmental attention. also both served as examples of the violent na-
And,although some ofthe progress carried over ture of insurgency,owing to the behavior of the
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Algerians protest the disappearance offamily members during the civil war in Algeria in a demonstration in Algiers
on September 28,2005.The government is blamed for various human rights abuses.(Louafi Larbi/Reuters/Corbis)
insurgent groups and the repressive apparatus the distributional arrangements extant in the
brought to bear against them by the govern- economy.Ifthe vocabulary used to describe this
ment.And,although the current conflict is not a position happened to be religious, or even if
war for independence,similarities persist,too,in these supporters understood their stance as a re-
the type of conflict.Although some researchers ligious one,it does not follow that the conflict it-
code the war that began in 1992 as an “ethnic/re- selfwas ofa religious nature.Similarly,although
ligious/identity conflict” (Doyle and Sambanis supporters of the government and the govern-
2000),it is not clear that the conflict can be un- ment itself couched their opposition to the Is-
derstood within this framework. The insurgent lamists in terms of their perception of the Is-
groups in Algeria clearly professed a religious lamist platform as an extreme one, this
agenda at a superficial level—they discussed the perspective was often used to discredit the Is-
role ofreligion in governance,used religious ter- lamists and gain support for the government
minology to discuss the situation in Algeria,and from outside powers (mainly France and the
incorporated the word Islam into the names of United States).Thus it is not entirely a true char-
their organizations. However, the extent to acterization ofthe nature ofthe conflict itself.
which the conflict itselfconcerned the role ofre- Outside these analytical understandings of
ligion is more ambiguous. Even supporters of the conflict are harsh facts about what it actually
the insurgents who emphasized the importance meant for Algeria and Algerians.The conflict it-
of the groups’ religious stance characterized selfis ongoing and has so far taken the lives ofas
their reasons for supporting the insurgents in many as 150,000 people,mostly civilians (Stone
terms of the changes they wanted to see in the 1997;Martinez 2004).If this figure is correct,it
form ofgovernance provided by the regime and represents the death of more than 4 percent of
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the prewar population. Approximately 40,000 and perhaps other small insurgent groups remain
people either have left the country or have been active,though on a smaller scale compared to the
internally displaced.A large percentage ofAlgeri- mid-1990s.Even as of2005,violence persists.
ans also participated in the conflict:the Algerian
armed forces numbered approximately 130,000
The Insurgents
in the mid-1990s,and at their height armed in-
surgent groups may have had as many as 40,000 Armed insurgency against the Algerian govern-
members (Stone 1997;Martinez 2000).These fig- ment began in earnest following the military
ures, of course, say nothing of the effects that coup that deposed President Chadli Bendjedid
death,migration,or participation in the conflict on January 11, 1992. The previous three years
have had on the social networks of the victims, had seen demonstrations and riots leading to
immigrants,or participants.Finally,although one the first multiparty elections in Algerian history;
of the main insurgent groups, the Armée Is- a significant victory by the FIS,an umbrella or-
lamique du Salut (AIS), signed a truce in 1997 ganization of Islamist groups that opposed the
and ultimately surrendered in January 2000,po- government; further demonstrations against
litical violence has by no means vanished from government interference with the elections re-
Algeria. The Groupes Islamiques Armées (GIA) sults and, following these, the institution of
Table 1:Civil War in Algeria
War MIA,AIS,MEI,GIA,GSPC and other groups vs.the Government ofAlgeria
Dates 1992–present
Casualties 150,000
Regime type prior to war –2 [ranging from –10 (authoritarian) to 10 (democracy)]
Regime type after war Not applicable;from 1/1992–11/1995:–7;11/1995–:–3
GDP/capita year war began US$4,902 [constant 1996]
GDP/capita 5 years after war Not applicable
Insurgents Armed Islamic Movement (MIA),Islamic Army ofSalvation (AIS),Movement
for the Islamic State (MEI),Islamic Armed Groups (GIA),Salafi Group for
Preaching and Combat (GSPC),Islamic Front ofJihad in Algeria (FIDA),
Salafi Combatant Group (GSC),Salafi Group for the Jihad (GSPD),Guardians
ofthe Salafi Call (HDS),and Islamic League for Preaching and Jihad (LIDD).
Issue Failed liberalization ofgovernance
Rebel funding Import–export companies,extortion ofindividuals and businesses,illegal
automobile imports,diaspora and sympathizers
Role ofgeography Insurgents established bases in mountainous interior;government used
prisons in southern desert and was able to isolate and protect the hydrocarbon
sector,a main source ofrevenue in that area.
Role ofresources Hydrocarbon sector and investment in it was a large source ofrevenue for the
government
Immediate outcome Ongoing
Outcome after 5 years Not applicable
Role ofUN None
Role ofregional organization None
Refugees 40,000 (including internally displaced persons)
Prospects for peace Favorable
Sources:Doyle and Sambanis 2000;Economist Intelligence Unit Algeria Profile and Algeria Report,various years;Hafez 2000;
Heston,Summers,and Aten 2002;International Crisis Group 2004;Lowi 2005;Marshall,Jaggers,and Gurr 2004;
Martinez 2000,2004;Stone 1997.
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THE INSURGENTS | 107
martial law; and a final round of elections, FIS leaders in June 1991.With the repression of
which the FIS seemed poised to win. In short, the FIS in 1992, the MIA and other armed
prior to the coup,Algeria was on a rapid course groups took the opportunity to bring a military
toward fundamental changes in the distribution confrontation with the government to the fore,
of power in society through the increasing the electoral approach of the FIS having been
power ofthe FIS in government.When the army discredited in light of the government’s re-
stepped in to end this process by seizing control sponse. MIA was selective in its recruitment
of the government from President Bendjedid process and explicitly did not allow perhaps
and canceling the election results, armed Is- thousands ofeager volunteers to join it,particu-
lamist groups that existed even prior to these de- larly out offear that the Securite Militaire would
velopments saw an opportunity to mount a di- infiltrate it.In 1992,the MIA had approximately
rect challenge to the government. As the army 2,000 members but by 1993 was thought to have
consolidated its power and attempted to repress grown to 22,000. Initially, it competed with
the Islamists, declaring a state of emergency in smaller groups such as Takfir wa-l Hijra,also es-
February 1992 and banning the FIS in March tablished before the military coup,but of these
1992, these groups began to attack the govern- groups the MIA alone was able to survive the
ment and security forces and to assert control counteroffensives of the government’s security
over areas sympathetic to the FIS.As the conflict forces,making it the center ofthe insurgency.By
continued, new groups formed, bringing new 1994, however, the MIA was considerably
goals and new tactics to the conflict. weaker and was seen as unsuccessful in challeng-
The insurgents can be grouped according to ing the government.
their political orientation, following Martinez Given the large numbers of people eager to
(2000): groups that sought to force the govern- participate in the insurgency,the creation ofad-
ment to reinstate the political process through ditional armed groups was possible,and in 1994
which the FIS had been gaining power prior to the AIS was established. The AIS did not have
the military coup,and revolutionary groups em- the first-mover advantage that the MIA had in
phasizing jihad, which sought the complete attracting recruits,but it benefited substantially
overthrow of the state.To these may be added a from the release ofprisoners from prison camps
third category:local groups acting in the context in the south in 1993 and 1994,and estimates put
ofcivil war whose principal purpose was to take its membership in 1994 at 40,000.The AIS con-
advantage of the economic opportunities cre- tinued the MIA’s focus on insurgency to reinsti-
ated by the war. tute the political process, concentrating on at-
The groups that sought to force the return of tacking the government and security forces.
the political process that would have brought the However,its assessment was that the war could
FIS to power were active principally at the be- not be won in the quick and limited fashion that
ginning of the conflict. The first of these, the many thought possible .Thus,the AIS sought to
Mouvement Islamique Armé (MIA) had origi- work on a much broader scale than the MIA,
nally been active between 1982 and 1987. In and it planned for a long conflict with the Alger-
1990, the MIA began preparations for insur- ian government.
gency, establishing infrastructure and training Radical groups emerged in 1993 that chal-
camps in the Blida Atlas mountains.Although it lenged the idea, taken up by the MIA and the
agreed with the FIS not to interfere with the AIS,of returning to the political process and,to
elections,the MIA’s preparations for war intensi- that end, of focusing on targeting the govern-
fied as the government’s repression ofthe FIS in- ment.Established in 1991,the Mouvement pour
creased, with MIA members withdrawing from l’Etat Islamique (MEI)focused on taking the bat-
the cities to the mountains after the arrests of tle to the people ofAlgeria.Rather than viewing
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the conflict as one between the elite of the MIA a key role in the development ofthe conflict—a
against the government—the MEI hoped to win process noted by many observers of political vi-
over the people of Algeria and,in so doing,de- olence outside the Algerian context (della Porta
prive the government of any support.With this 1995; White 1989). However, an often-men-
outlook,the MEI accepted all those who wished tioned and more controversial possibility is that
to fight for it.The GIA took a similar approach the government played an active role in the de-
to the MEI,which divided civilians into “enemies velopment of the armed groups—for example,
of Islam”and “supporters of the jihad,”the for- by carrying out atrocities and then blaming the
mer being legitimate targets. Targeting civilians GIA,or by infiltrating the GIA and encouraging
forced them to choose between supporting the massacres and killings ofpublic figures in an ef-
government or the Islamists. The GIA’s strategy fort to turn public opinion against the Islamists.
in the war is understood as one of“total war,”the These allegations are difficult to assess;although
destruction of the ruling regime by eliminating there seems to have been an incentive for the
all bases ofsocial support for it.In contrast to the government to act this way, firsthand accounts
MIA and AIS, the GIA was active for the most report that those carrying out the attacks were
part in urban settings,whereas the MIA and the indeed members of the groups that the govern-
AIS were firmly established in and conducted ment blamed.Still,it is important to understand
operations from mountainous areas.From 1998 the role of the government in a more complex
on, the GIA and a splinter group from it, the way that goes beyond its own official statements
Groupe Salafi pour la Predication et le Combat on the conflict.Martinez (2004) provides an ex-
(GSPC), as well as other groups related to the ample of such an analysis,noting that the gov-
GSPC have been active. ernment’s war-fighting strategy may have been
Despite the clear ideologies of the different indirectly responsible for the massacres of civil-
insurgent groups, it is not possible to extend ians during mid-1990s. Unable to occupy the
the understanding of these ideologies to their territory needed to wrest control from the insur-
actual behavior.It is here that the role of local gents with its own forces, the government cre-
organizations and leaders,often mentioned in ated local militias as a surrogate force.Although
detailed accounts of the conflict, emerges. the militias were a successful tool in combating
First,given the secret nature ofthe groups,it is the insurgency,it is possible that through milita-
not possible to judge the degree of organiza- rizing the population they generated a retalia-
tion with which they operated and the degree tory dynamic in which insurgents attacked civil-
to which decisions were made centrally. The ians to punish them for participating in the
MIA and the AIS exhibited a higher degree of conflict through the militias.
control in this regard than the GIA, which al-
lowed the leaders of local groups to act in its Financing
name without hesitation. Second, local armed As mentioned earlier,the local dynamics of the
groups, extremely active in the suburbs of Al- conflict were extremely important, nowhere
giers,played a significant role in the conflict in more so than in its financing. In areas directly
its day-to day-conduct. Although these may under their control,the armed groups acted as a
have operated in the name of one of the larger parallel government,essentially collecting taxes
players, often the considerations that drove from the populace and carrying out administra-
their conduct were purely local. tive functions. In contested areas, the armed
A final caveat concerns the role ofthe govern- groups put together finances through extortion
ment in the development of the armed groups. of business owners and collection of bribes
It is clear that the government repression in re- from operators in the transit sector in return for
sponse to the challenge of the insurgents played allowing them to continue to operate.Through
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THE INSURGENTS | 109
supporters and their own members,the groups supported the FIS and continued to remain a
also drew in large amounts ofrevenue from the base ofsupport for the Islamists.
often-informal import–export sector of the
economy. At times, this revenue stream was Geography
linked to illegal activity,as when leaders of the As in the war for independence,the mountains
armed groups were able to obtain revenue of Algeria played a key role in the current civil
through illicit imports of cars from France war. They provided a base of operations for
using the networks established for the drug groups such as the MIA and AIS, which estab-
trade from Morocco. Finally, the groups re- lished themselves securely there and then carried
ceived funding from the Algerian diaspora in out operations elsewhere in the country.The re-
Europe.The effects of financing can be seen in lationship between terrain and the conflict ex-
the patterns of activity of the armed groups tends beyond the basic idea of safe havens.The
throughout the conflict. Most active in the mountains ofAlgeria proved to be an important
southern suburbs of Algiers,home to relatively element in the development of the conflict par-
wealthy businessmen,the groups did not oper- ticularly because some,like the Blida Atlas,were
ate in the more central,poorer areas of Algiers, located close to important areas of operations
even though these were areas that had strongly for the insurgents. Thus, the MIA and the AIS
Algiers Tizi-Ouzou SkikdaSKIKDA
GHIZILANE LEMDIYYA 12Bejaïa 15 Annaba
Mascara Boufarik STIF
N Rabat TlemMTTTIIIOcLLLIIIeOUMMMnASSSrEEESaNNNKn11A2R SSaaïï33ddaaTTTTTIIIHHH4iiaaEEErrRRRee7TTTtt65 DDjjee8llffaa91MMM1'''SSS1IIILLL0AAA13SSBBBBBééaaAAAttttiiTTTMMMnnff1NNNaaIII4LLLAAAAAA 2201181TTT6BBBEEESSS1111SSS7999TTAAAéébbCaassossnaasTtaunntiinse
DDDJJJEEELLLFFFAAA
BBBEEESSSKKKRRRAAA
SSSIIIDDDIII BBBEEELLL LLLaaaggghhhooouuuaaattt BBiisskkrraa
AAABBBBBBÈÈSS NNNAAAAAAMMMAAA SSSAAAÏÏDDDAAA LLLAAAGGGHHHOOOUUUAAATTT
TUNISIA
MOROCCO EEELLL BBBEEEYYYYYYAAADDDHHH TToouuggggoouurrtt EEELLL WWWAAADDD
BBééccchhhaaarrr OOuuaarrggllaa
GGGHHHAAARRRDDDAAAÏÏAA
BBBEEECCCHHHAAARRR
WWWAAARRRGGGLLLAAA
LIBYA
TTTIIINNNDDDOOOUUUFFF
IIILLLIIIZZZIII
IIlllliizzii
MAURITANIA AAADDDRRRAAARRR
12 AWÏNA HTRÉAMNOUCHENT TTTAAAMMMEEENNNGGGHHHEEESSSTTT
3 MESTGHANEM
4 ECH CHELIFF TTaammaannrraasssseett
5 TIPAZA
6 AÏN DEFLA
7 TISSEMSILT
8 EL BOULAIDA
9 BOUMERDÈS
10 TIZI-OUZOU
11 BOUÏRA
12 BEJAÏA
1134 BJIJOELRDJ BOU ARRERIDJ MALI NIGER
15 QUACENTINA
16 ANNABA
17 EL TARF 0 100 200 300 mi
18 GUELMA
1290 SOOUUMQ E AL HBORAUSAGUI Oil Pipeline Kidal 0 100 200 300 400 500 km
21 KHENCHLA Oil field
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could operate in the southern suburbs of Al- lenge. The government’s subsequent defeat of
giers,important for their revenues and symboli- insurgent forces in the mountains,coming as it
cally in that they were part of the capital, and did after an extensive overhaul and reconstruc-
then retreat to the mountains.Forest cover may tion of the security forces, is not surprising in
also have served a similar function,though in a this view.
less extensive manner.
Related to the control armed groups could Tactics
exert,the existence ofa small number ofimpor- The brutality of the Algerian civil war, as evi-
tant highway routes for commerce allowed the denced by the massacres ofcivilians in the mid-
groups to use a system ofcheckpoints to demar- to late 1990s,was one ofthe most notorious fea-
cate territory as well as to draw revenues.As for tures of the conflict. The vast majority of ob-
the GIA and local armed groups, the city’s ter- servers understood this violence as “irrational,”
rain facilitated their operations in urban areas. but in fact patterns ofviolence have been related
The absence of an urban plan privileged local to the dynamics of control used by the combat-
knowledge ofthe layout ofthe neighborhood in ants (Kalyvas,1999).Although ultimately an ex-
battles with the security forces,and this worked planation ofthe intertemporal and spatial varia-
to the insurgents’advantage. tion in the violence is desirable,it is instructive
Nevertheless, it would be too simplistic to to understand the ideology ofthe armed groups
view terrain in Algeria as solely benefiting the as it relates to the tactics they pursued in the war
insurgents or proving a direct asset to them.The and the resulting patterns of violence, and key
government made extensive use ofdesert prison aspects of the interaction between the govern-
camps in the south,allowing it to effectively re- ment and the insurgents that also shaped the vi-
move large numbers of suspected combatants olence. Finally, related to these questions is the
and sympathizers to a location remote from the puzzle ofwhy the insurgents appeared not to at-
theater of operations.Even the terrain of use to tempt to strike at the Algerian government di-
the insurgents was by no means a secure tool for rectly in order to depose it.
them.The government was able to defeat insur- As discussed above,the MIA and the AIS fo-
gents in the mountains by using air power and cused almost exclusively on attacking security
local militias, and it also developed security forces and government officials, while the GIA
forces specializing in counterinsurgent opera- and the MEI put civilians squarely in the middle
tions in the urban areas.The conclusion drawn of the conflict. The decision to target civilians
by Fearon and Laitin (2003)—that rough terrain came largely out of the GIA and MEI radical
is a risk factor for civil war—seems to hold in perspective on the conflict as a “total war,”one in
Algeria on its surface:The insurgents did indeed which civilians would need to choose sides and
make use of the mountains in developing their one that would be won by winning the populace,
organizations at the beginning of the conflict. not be eliminating the security forces in a war of
Had it not been for the mountains,the MIA and attrition,a strategy more akin to that ofthe MIA
the AIS might have faced severe challenges in and AIS.Even more specific targeting decisions
mounting an armed assault on the government may be attributed to the radical perspective,
and may not have attempted it.However,Algeria which held that the entire order supporting the
demonstrates that the role of terrain may be current regime would need to be destroyed.
more appropriately considered in its interaction Thus, the competition between Francophones
with the strength of the government. In this and Arabic speakers in the economic arena car-
analysis,terrain was beneficial to the insurgents ried over to the armed conflict itself,and armed
when the government’s repressive apparatus was groups threatened and killed journalists from
insufficiently developed to deal with their chal- French-language media outlets.
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CAUSES OF THE WAR | 111
The widespread involvement of civilians and further attention, given that an explanation
their deaths can also be attributed to the exigen- would illuminate the motivations of the insur-
cies of fighting that the insurgents and the gov- gent groups and would therefore validate
ernment faced. Both tried to force civilians to broader claims about the nature of the conflict,
choose a side by employing violent tactics,such some ofwhich are discussed below.
that violence became a recruiting tool. Both
sides also involved the civilian populace in pro-
Causes of the War
viding financial and logistical support. This re-
sulted in civilian deaths either as part of the es- Analysts of the Algerian civil war commonly at-
tablishment of the authority of a group or due tribute it to a combination ofthe economic and
to competition between groups, including the social crises the country experienced in the
government, a dynamic explored in depth by 1980s,the failure of the regime to address these
Kalyvas (1999). As noted earlier, the govern- crises,and the military’s refusal to allow the elec-
ment’s tactic ofestablishing civilian militias may toral process bringing the Islamists into power
also have accentuated these dynamics by making to continue (see Testas [2001] for a development
civilians more direct participants in the conflict of the economic perspective and a summary of
and thereby subject to retaliatory actions by the other arguments;see also Martinez [2000] for a
insurgents (Martinez 2004).Overall,these char- summary of the standard arguments).A related
acteristics of the war in Algeria fit within the analysis that probes the mechanisms of this
theoretical perspective proposed by Azam and process suggests that that the Algerian govern-
Hoeffler (2002)—that civilians become targets ment, as a rentier state, was unable to address
either because of the extortive activities of the persistent conflicts in Algerian society (see for
parties to the conflict or because targeting civil- example Joffé [2002] and Lowi [2004]). Mar-
ians serves a direct military purpose. tinez disputes such perspectives as flawed in that
At another level is the question ofwhy the in- economic and social inequality cannot on their
surgent groups,when attacking the government own account for the war, as their persistence
and the security forces,focused throughout the during the entire postindependence period (if
conflict on sabotage,assassination,and more pe- not at a constant level) demonstrates, nor can
ripheral attacks than any all-out attempt to problems of governance.Rather,the opportuni-
wrest control directly from the entire govern- ties available through war,combined with these
ment.The guerrilla war fought by the insurgent factors, provided the basis for the war. This
groups can be attributed largely to the resources analysis places understanding the Algerian civil
available to them.Numerically far fewer than the war squarely in the middle ofan ongoing debate
government’s security forces and without the in the literature on civil war onset: Do griev-
heavy weaponry and air support available to the ances or opportunities explain conflict? The
government,the insurgents likely focused on ac- causes ofthe Algerian civil war can be further il-
tions in which they could succeed.Nevertheless, luminated by taking an overview of this debate
this led to frustration among civilians, who and highlighting where these accounts validate
questioned why the violence seemed always to extant understandings of the war in Algeria or
be that of a war of attrition played out at the suggest new avenues of analysis.Finally,the na-
local level rather than a direct confrontation ture ofthe war in Algeria suggests areas in which
with the power center of the government (Mar- these theories can be refined, specified with
tinez 2000). Still, although resource constraints greater detail,or perhaps rejected.
may have been behind the tactical choices ofin- Current work on civil wars and civil war onset
surgents, these choices have not been explored follows a rational choice approach, examining
in detail by analysts of the conflict. They merit the decision calculus ofwould-be insurgents and
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weighing the factors that might prompt them to time or under an alternative regime of their
launch an insurgency against the deterrent that choosing. This view stands in contrast to other
the current government can mount.In itself,this evaluations of the conflict as stemming from
framework allows the possibility of the effect of mounting grievances against and frustration
both grievances and opportunities. However, with the government,touched offby the repres-
cross-national studies of civil war have found sive actions of the army. Potential financial re-
that opportunities (rather than grievances) ap- sources through informal trade, extortion, and
pear to be the significant factor in predicting civil external sources, combined with the refuge of
war onset (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and the mountains close to areas in which they
Hoeffler 2002). Chief among the predictors of might wish to operate and the dire financial sit-
civil war onset are thought to be per capita in- uation of the government, may well have con-
come (negatively related), whether a state was vinced the armed groups of the possibility of
new (positively related), mountainous terrain their survival—and perhaps even succeed—
(positively related), population (positively re- against the government. The opportunity to
lated),and fossil fuel exports (positively related) profit from conflict,as well as the ability to re-
(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler distribute economic wealth to their supporters,
2002; see also Hegre and Sambanis 2006 for an may also have motivated both the insurgents
evaluation ofrobustness ofresults in the empiri- and the government to take steps that led to
cal literature). Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti conflict,particularly in the context ofa economy
(2004) call into question the specific variables that was on the decline.
posited as significant in previous studies,using a
more appropriate estimation strategy in their
Outcome
work on civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa.Their
principal findings were that GDP growth is nega- Conflict Status
tively related to incidence of civil war and that The Algerian civil war has lasted approximately
the effect of income shocks on the incidence of fourteen years and is ongoing.Recent cross-na-
civil war appears not to vary with other factors tional data sets ofcivil wars code the war as on-
previously thought important (for example, going through 1999 (Sambanis 2004; Fearon
GDP and oil exports).These findings are consis- 2004;Fearon and Laitin 2003).Since that point,
tent with views that draw connections between although it is clear that the level of conflict has
civil war and opportunities. been decreasing steadily, violence continues.
The perspective just outlined is instructive in President Boutleflika, who took office in 1999,
the case ofthe Algerian civil war.It incorporates quickly extended an amnesty offer to insurgents,
the focus of Martinez (2000) on the opportuni- provided that they surrendered. The AIS re-
ties available in Algeria through war but also ar- ceived a full amnesty for its members on January
ticulates how the opportunity structure that po- 13, 2000, leading to what amounted to its sur-
tential combatants face can determine whether render. In addition to an estimated 3,000 AIS
or not they act to address any extant political, fighters thereby removed from the conflict,per-
social, or economic problems through conflict. haps 2,000 to 3,000 other insurgents surren-
The calculation ofthe armed groups to begin an dered under the amnesty.
insurgency against the government after the The GIA and the GSPC rejected the amnesty
cancellation ofelections in January 1992 may be and continued their activities, the GIA in the
seen as a careful evaluation oftheir prospects for west (Tipaazza,Chlef and Ain Delfa provinces)
survival and success in a war against the govern- and in areas to the south of Algiers, and the
ment,and as an evaluation of the opportunities GSPC in portions of the east and Kabylia. In
available to them under the government at the 2000, an estimated 1,500 to 3,000 insurgents